


8 March 1965


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. Upon reading Ambassador Taylor's telegram to the Department (Saigon 2891) and the related Agency cable (IN 17701) from Jorgenson, I telephoned Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Marshall Green, who is standing in for Bill Bundy as Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, on the morning



2. I also made it a point with both gentlemen that I took some objection to the language employed by Ambassador Taylor in the sentence concerning [REDACTED]

3. I have requested DDP to pursue this matter further with Mr. Green. The two messages referred to are attached.



Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

Distribution:

- 0 - O/DDCI
- 1 - Mr. Elder for DCI
- 1 - Executive Director
- 1 - DD/P
- 1 - Chief, FE
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State Dept. review completed

31788  
PAGE 1 OF 3  
LIMDIS

NON-CIA TELETYPE  
MESSAGE

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PP RUEPIA

DE RUEHCR 6278 08/0900Z

P 080816Z ZEA

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

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INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

RUEKDA/DOD

RUEPIA/CIA

P 080715Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

SECRET/PRIORITY 2891 MARCH 8, 3 PM

DEPTEL 1914.

I DO NOT AGREE WITH THE ATTITUDE WHICH IS BEING TAKEN BY WASHINGTON OFFICIALS TOWARD GENERAL KHUYH. WE SHOULD ALWAYS KEEP IN MIND HIS PAST RECORD AND PRESENT STANDING IN SVN AND CONDUCT OURSELVES ACCORDINGLY. REGARDLESS OF THE HERO'S DEPARTURE

SECRET

GIVEN HIM IN SAIGON, HE WAS EVICTED FROM OFFICE AND FROM THE COUNTRY BECAUSE HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES BECAME FINALLY CONVINCED THAT HIS INVETERATE TROUBLE- MAKING AND SHIFTY MANEUVERING FOR PERSONAL ADVANTAGE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO TOLERATE HIM ANY LONGER IN THE COUNTRY. HE IS REGARDED BY THE CIVILIAN LEADERS AS THE ARCH ENEMY OF CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WHO SOME DAY WILL TRY TO RETURN TO HEAD A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP. HE IS KNOWN IN ALL QUARTERS AS THE MAN WHO PUBLICLY DENOUNCED U.S. POLICY, ATTACKED THE U.S. AMBASSADOR AND THEREBY LOST U.S. SUPPORT. IT IS THIS LATTER FACT WHICH RAISED THE COURAGE LEVEL OF THE OTHER GENERALS TO THE POINT OF SACKING HIM.

KHANH KNOWS THAT HIS HOPE FOR THE FUTURE RESTS IN HIS ABILITY TO BECOME KNOWN AGAIN AS "OUR BOY"; HENCE HIS PRIME PURPOSE IN THE U.S. WILL BE TO REGAIN U.S. FAVOR OR THE APPEARANCE THEREOF. THE THREE- WEEK TRIP WITH COLONEL WILSON WILL BE REPORTED AND INTERPRETED HERE AS AN INDICATION OF A RETURN TO FAVOR AND WILL GIVE KHANH GROUNDS FOR CLAIMING U.S. SUPPORT WHEN HE REAPPEARS TO MAKE HIS NEXT BID FOR POWER IN SAIGON-- AND HE WILL PROBABLY WANT TO MAKE HIS REAPPEARANCE SOON. IF THIS TRIP SCHEDULE MUST BE FOLLOWED (AND I WOULD HOPE IT COULD BE SIDETRACKED), I AGREE THAT THE KEY SHOULD BE THE LOWEST POSSIBLE BUT I SUSPECT THAT KHANH WILL SEE THAT THE KEY IS HIGH IN SAIGON.

IN SUMMARY, I WOULD SAY WE SHOULD TREAT KHANH POLITELY BUT COOLY, INTIMATING TACITLY THAT THE TEMPERATURE OF FUTURE RELATIONS WILL DEPEND STRICTLY ON HIS PERFORMANCE AND NOT ON THE PROTESTATIONS OF LOYALTY TO THE US WHICH HE WILL MAKE. I WOULD RETURN COLONEL WILSON TO DUTY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE; IN FACT, I WOULD NOT HAVE

SECRET

APPROVED OF HIS ASSIGNMENT AS ESCORT OFFICER HAD I KNOWN OF THE PROJECT. IF KHANH ASKS FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF ANY OF HIS OLD

[REDACTED] HE

25X1

SHOULD BE POLITELY TURNED DOWN. HE SHOULD BE KEPT BUSY WHILE IN THE U.S. AND STARTED SOON ON HIS ROVING WAY THROUGH FOREIGN CAPITALS WHERE HE CAN DO SOME GOOD IN PRESENTING THE VIETNAMESE CASE. KHANH NEEDS THE U.D. BUT THE U.S. DOES NOT NEED KHANH. I WILL DISCUSS THE WHOLE MATTER WITH QUAT AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY. AFTER ALL, WE ARE MAKING PLANS FOR THE CONDUCT OF HIS AMBASSADOR AND HE PROBABLY HAS HIS OWN IDEAS ON THE SUBJECT. TAYLOR

BT

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